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and financial analyses of federal interventions
into private credit and insurance markets, several
sessions analyzed the political and policymaking
processes that bring federal credit and insurance
programs into existence and make their operation
sometimes difficult to understand and resistant
to change. Some speakers focused their remarks
on micro-level details, such as program design and
participant incentives, while others considered
macro-level impacts on financial markets and
the long-run sustainability of publicly financed
credit and insurance programs.
LONG-TERM SOLVENCY OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT
Is the United States bankrupt? Most people
would scoff at the notion that the U.S. government
cannot now, or in future will not be able to, pay
its bills. Bankruptcy of the federal government
seems particularly far-fetched since the U.S.
Treasury continues to issue billions of dollars of
long-term unsecured debt every month at histori-
cally low yields. Who would lend money to Uncle
Sam at 5 percent interest for 30 years if there were
any question about timely repayment in full?
Indeed, the globally integrated capital markets
seem to have imposed no risk premium on
Treasury borrowings despite a rapidly growing
outstanding debt of about $5 trillion ($8 trillion
if all intra-government borrowings are included). 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff believes the question of
the bankruptcy of the U.S. government is not only
W
hat role does the federal govern-
ment play in the private markets
for credit and insurance today,
and what role should it play in
the future? These questions served as the organ-
izing themes for the Thirtieth Annual Economic
Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. This introductory article provides
an overview of the conference presentations and
discussants’ comments.
A distinguished group of scholars and policy-
makers gathered on October 20-21, 2005, to
describe, analyze, and propose reforms to a wide
range of federal credit and insurance programs.
The discussions took on added importance
because virtually all the federal programs at
issue were under active legislative consideration
at the time of the conference. A note of immediacy
was injected into the deliberations by the still-
unfolding disaster unleashed by the Gulf Coast
hurricanes of August and September 2005 and
the hesitating response of national, state, and
local governments to the crisis.
Conference participants discussed a wide
range of federal credit and insurance programs.
The programs included some that provide broad-
based social insurance (Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid) and others that more narrowly target
housing (low-income mortgage insurance and
guarantees, housing-related government-sponsored
enterprises [GSEs]), private pensions (defined-
benefit [DB] pension insurance), or disaster relief
(flood insurance, earthquake insurance, terrorism-
risk insurance). In addition to extensive economic
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      worthy of serious discussion, but that the answer
to the question is clearly “yes.” The primary
sources of the problem are well-known—extensive
social-insurance commitments together with
prospective revenue streams that are grossly
inadequate to fund these promises. The primary
reason most people fail to appreciate the dire
financial straits in which the U.S. government
finds itself (and, by extension, the future burdens
we U.S. taxpayers face), Kotlikoff suggests, is
that government accounting is seriously flawed.
Government accounts are presented on a “cash,” or
non-accrual, basis, in which only those revenues
and outlays that already have occurred are recog-
nized. When, instead, a comprehensive, forward-
looking accrual framework is applied to the current
and likely future financial revenues and obliga-
tions of the U.S. government, the fiscal picture
is dire.
Citing an estimate by Jagadeesh Gokhale and
Kent Smetters (2005), Kotlikoff argues that the U.S.
government’s fiscal gap as of 2004—the shortfall
of the present discounted value of all likely future
government revenues compared with the present
discounted value of all likely future government
outlays—amounted to $65.9 trillion. Thus, rather
than facing a cumulative federal government
debt-to-current-GDP ratio of about 37 percent in
2004 (as suggested by the $5 trillion of publicly
held federal government debt), a more accurate
estimate would be 562 percent of current GDP.
Kotlikoff points out that, in one way or another,
future government budgets will have to bring
revenues and outlays into balance. The issue is
whether, as a matter of public policy, we are will-
ing to let things sort themselves out, perhaps in a
series of financial crises and forced choices, such
as huge tax increases. To plan rationally involves
either higher taxes, lower government spending,
a partial repudiation or devaluation of government
debt (via inflation), or some combination of these
approaches. If we don’t choose now the combina-
tion of unpleasant policies we find least objection-
able, we could face an uncertain and unpleasant
economic future. Kotlikoff reviews several spe-
cific policy options, then proposes far-reaching
reforms to the tax system and arrangements for
retirement and medical insurance. 
Discussant Anjan Thakor asks whether
Kotlikoff’s proposition that the U.S. government
may now be, or may become, bankrupt is the right
way to think about the situation. Thakor describes
three different stages of financial distress in a
corporate setting: pre-bankruptcy financial dis-
tress, the bankruptcy process itself, and post-
bankruptcy liquidation.
The hallmarks of pre-bankruptcy corporate
financial distress are a marked deterioration in the
business prospects of the firm and, consequently,
loss of access to external financing sources. The
typical responses of the distressed firm are to
restructure its business and/or renegotiate its
obligations. Presumably, neither the corporate
creditors nor the debtor really want to incur the
disruption and inefficiency associated with debt
default.
Only when efforts to restructure and renego-
tiate fail would we expect a distressed firm or its
creditors to file for bankruptcy. The formal bank-
ruptcy process brings in an outside party—the
bankruptcy court—to continue efforts to resolve
the situation. Formal bankruptcy is a process of
mediated renegotiation of formal obligations. The
bankruptcy court breaks any stalemates that arose
during pre-bankruptcy negotiations and imposes
solutions on all interested parties. Finally, liqui-
dation occurs only when the business prospects
of the firm are judged so dire that no amount of
restructuring or renegotiation justifies continua-
tion of the firm.
Does the U.S. government’s financial situation
bear any resemblance to any of these stages of
bankruptcy? The government’s assets certainly
are not in the process of being forcibly liquidated
by creditors. For that matter, the notion of a formal
bankruptcy process mediated by an outside party
appears unrealistic, as well. After all, the vast
majority of the U.S. government’s liabilities to
foreigners are denominated in U.S. dollars, which
can be supplied virtually at will. Furthermore, the
relevant debt-to-GDP ratio when using a forward-
looking framework would seem to include not
only current GDP, but future GDP, as well. On
this basis, the debt-to-GDP ratio would be much
smaller and less foreboding.
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the U.S. government’s financial situation resem-
bles bankruptcy is that future financial distress
is conceivable, if not likely. The country’s eco-
nomic prospects may not be as bright as when
earlier promises were made, and renegotiation
of some kind may become necessary. But while
it may need to renegotiate social and financial
contracts between generations and with creditors,
the U.S. government does not deserve the term
“bankrupt.” To avoid abrupt and painful course
corrections later, Thakor nevertheless believes
that Kotlikoff’s reform proposals deserve serious
consideration today.
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Douglas J. Elliott takes a “plumber’s perspec-
tive” on federal financial programs and institu-
tions. That is, rather than debating why federal
credit and insurance programs of various types
exist, or whether they should be changed or elim-
inated, he describes the challenges of actually
managing them properly. The managers of federal
credit and insurance programs and institutions
operate at the intersection of national politics,
regulatory policymaking, and government bureau-
cracy—a challenging working environment, to
say the least.
A feature common to many federal credit and
insurance programs is their off-budget headline
appeal to politicians. Congress often extends
multibillion-dollar government-lending authority
or insurance protection without appropriating
funds in that amount. This can occur in the form
of unfunded programs, such as the National Flood
Insurance Program, or in the form of government
enterprises, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) or the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), or even in the
“off-off-budget” form of GSEs, which are privately
owned, such as the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Thus,
a politician can tout a multibillion-dollar federal
program benefiting his or her constituents with-
out actually having to secure budget authority
for spending in that amount. 
Given the uncertain future costs and unclear
lines of authority and responsibility inherent in
many of these arrangements, program and enter-
prise managers may pursue goals other than, or in
addition to, operating efficiency and minimiza-
tion of the ultimate cost to the taxpayer. Moreover,
Congress often writes rules and provisions into
authorizing legislation that reflect political con-
siderations—such as preferences for certain dis-
advantaged groups or targeted activities—that may
conflict with standard management principles for
a financial institution, such as risk-based pricing.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the General Accountability Office (GAO) are
two federal government agencies that seek to
analyze, and suggest resolutions to, some of the
more difficult conflicts among the mandates deliv-
ered by Congress to federal credit and insurance
programs and enterprises. However, the OMB
and the GAO have no authority to restructure or
sharpen the focus of any federal credit or insur-
ance program or enterprise, so political consider-
ations inevitably dominate.
Rather than despairing of any escape from the
crass politicization of federal financial programs,
Elliott points to examples of progress and suggests
extending these reforms. An encouraging example
of the federal government imposing some disci-
pline and sound management principles on itself
is the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. The Act
required all federal direct loans, loan guarantees,
grants, and credit insurance to be budgeted on a
comparable basis. That is, rather than applying
the government’s usual cash-budgeting approach
to these inherently long-lived commitments, the
Act required all future program cash flows to be
projected and then discounted back to the pres-
ent at an appropriate discount rate. Any shortfall
then would be recognized as a subsidy, while a
positive net present value associated with the
program’s cash flows would be recognized as a
surplus for the government.
Although the Federal Credit Reform Act of
1990 was a good start, Elliott believes much more
can and should be done to improve the manage-
ment of federal financial programs and institu-
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vant to the analysis and management of these
programs:
• What is the right discount rate to apply to
cash flows arising from a government-made
floating-rate loan?
• Should the government use a discount rate
that reflects the uncertainty associated with
future cash flows from a federal credit
program?
• How, if at all, should the discount rate used
for budgeting purposes be related to the
price charged, if any, to the users of the
program?
• Should a cost-benefit analysis be applied
to all federal credit programs? If so, how
will indirect and hard-to-measure costs
and benefits, such as externalities and
long-term effects, be incorporated?
• Should managers of federal credit programs
and institutions be required to apply state-
of-the-art modeling techniques to the finan-
cial risks they encounter, such as credit,
market, and operational risks? If so, how
will the programs and institutions acquire
and retain the expertise necessary to con-
duct these analyses?
• Can the Federal Credit Reform Act be
extended to encompass federal insurance
programs and institutions, such as the
PBGC, the National Flood Insurance
Program, and the federal Terrorism
Insurance Program?
In addition to budgeting and legislative reform,
Elliott argues that more and/or better people and
tools will be required to create meaningful and
lasting improvement in the management of federal
credit and insurance programs. To justify paying
higher salaries to the highly skilled government
employees needed to implement better manage-
ment practices, Elliott proposes creating a
“Certificate in Government Financial Institutions
Management.” Like the private sector Masters of
Business Administration (MBA) qualification, this
credential would both motivate young people to
acquire a core set of skills and signal to govern-
ment employers—and Congress—that certificate
holders deserve a skill premium. At the same time,
managers and employees in federal financial
programs and institutions must be provided with
up-to-date computing, telecommunication, and
other tools necessary to master the business
challenges they face.
Discussant George J. Benston commends
Elliott’s recommendations for improving the
management of federal financial programs and
institutions, but insists that an understanding of
the purpose of, and rationale for, every program
or institution is necessary to set priorities and
manage incentives in those settings. Benston sug-
gests that cynicism about the origins and purposes
of federal credit and insurance programs some-
times is appropriate. Some (many?) were created
to benefit special interests, so program structure
and details likely will reflect these priorities,
despite the best efforts of managers to overcome
them.
Benston provides tentative answers to several
of the specific questions that Elliott raises, such
as the proper discount rate to apply. He reminds
us, however, that economic rationality is some-
times not applied to federal programs not because
program managers do not know the “right” answer,
but because the purpose of the program is to be
politically expedient, not economically rational.
FEDERAL CREDIT AND 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS FOR
HOUSING
Significant federal intervention in the private
markets for housing construction, finance, and
insurance dates from the Great Depression. Today,
housing-related federal credit and insurance
programs and institutions are administered or
regulated in at least five cabinet-level depart-
ments: Housing and Urban Development (includ-
ing the Federal Housing Administration [FHA]
mortgage-insurance programs and regulation of
housing-related GSEs); Veterans Affairs (VA Home
Loan Program); Treasury (borrowing authority for
housing-related GSEs and regulation of commer-
cial banks and savings institutions); Homeland
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and Agriculture (Rural Housing Service).
John M. Quigley analyzes housing-related
federal credit and insurance activities covered
by the departments of Housing and Urban
Development and Veterans Affairs. Despite their
flaws and the perpetual need for long-standing
programs and institutions to evolve, Quigley
believes that the FHA, VA, and the housing-related
GSEs have “played major roles in the development
of liberal and efficient primary and secondary
mortgage markets in the United States.” Most of
their activity has been indirect—that is, not deal-
ing with households directly, but with financial
intermediaries instead—and much of it has been
conducted off-budget. Quigley has no quarrel with
the former approach, but suggests the latter policy
should be changed. Moreover, Quigley suggests
that housing-related federal credit and insurance
activities should be targeted more narrowly on
first-time homebuyers, in pursuit of the federal
government’s stated goal of maximizing the home-
ownership rate in the United States.
At the peak in 1957, FHA mortgage insurance
(funded by borrower premiums) and VA mortgage
guarantees (provided by the federal government)
together covered as much as 40 percent of the
dollar volume of new mortgage originations.
Today, the share of new mortgage originations
covered by FHA or VA programs has fallen into
the single digits. Quigley suggests there are two
factors that explain the relative decline of federal
government mortgage insurance and guarantee
programs during recent decades.
First, private sector mortgage lenders and
insurers were able to observe the success of FHA
and VA programs and copy them. This demonstra-
tion effect is easy to overlook today, when the
private mortgage market is large and thriving.
After the Depression and World War II, however,
there was genuine uncertainty in the private
financial market surrounding the feasibility of
widespread use of long-term, self-amortizing,
relatively high loan-to-value mortgages. Public
sector mortgage innovations “primed the pump”
for the private sector.
The second factor behind the relative decline
of FHA and VA mortgage programs was innovation
or flexibility—or the lack thereof by the govern-
ment housing agencies in the face of rapidly
evolving private sector activities. The clearest
example of rigidity imposing market-share losses
on FHA and VA programs was fixed-dollar loan
limits. In the face of inflation and rising incomes,
fewer and fewer mortgage borrowers qualified for
FHA and VA programs. Whereas 90 percent of
new houses built in 1964 would have qualified
for FHA insurance, only 15 percent of new houses
built in 1995 would qualify, based on actual sales
prices and FHA underwriting guidelines. Loan
limits were increased in 1995, but the potential
FHA share remains well below 50 percent of new
houses being built each year.
Just as the FHA and VA played an important
role in developing the primary mortgage market
in the United States, Quigley argues that the
government-owned Ginnie Mae and the privately
owned housing-related GSEs—including Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan
Banks—played important roles in developing the
secondary mortgage market. Quigley suggests
that, paralleling the experience of the FHA and
VA, a similar decline in the market shares of the
government-related mortgage-financing institu-
tions is under way (desirably so) as private sector
players copy government initiatives and innovate
in new directions.
Quigley reviews the extensive, but con-
tentious, literature that investigates the subsidies
received by the housing GSEs by virtue of their
association with the federal government. Both
the GSEs’ credit guarantees extended to their
mortgage-backed securities and the debt they
issue to fund portfolios of mortgage investments
benefit from certain legal advantages and per-
ceived, or “implicit,” recourse to the government.
Quigley concludes that the subsidies are signifi-
cant and that they are not passed through to
mortgage borrowers in their entirety; instead,
shareholders, employees, or other financial institu-
tions involved in mortgage securitization appear
to be “skimming off” some of the funds intended
for borrowers. Regarding the GSEs’ affordable-
housing goals, Quigley concludes that there is
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credit or housing activity in targeted markets.
There also is some evidence that FHA and GSE
affordable-housing activities work at cross pur-
poses to each other—that is, Fannie Mae’s and
Freddie Mac’s targeted lending may crowd out
lending that otherwise would have been provided
under an FHA program.
Quigley also weighs in on the controversial
topic of the broader economic and financial effects
of the housing GSEs. Evidence of nationwide
integration of previously local mortgage markets,
along with a more robust supply of mortgage credit
throughout the credit cycle in recent decades,
are consistent with positive effects produced by
the GSEs. Looking individually at the securitiza-
tion and investment activities of the GSEs, the
evidence suggests that the former is more impor-
tant than the latter for both integration and stabi-
lization of mortgage markets.
Quigley concludes by observing that “no one
designing a housing-finance system anew would
configure it much like the current system.” Gov-
ernment intervention in mortgage markets, includ-
ing the FHA, VA, Ginnie Mae, and the housing
GSEs, almost certainly spurred the development
of our broad and deep mortgage markets. Our
robust and flexible housing-finance system, in
turn, has produced large benefits for society and
the economy by helping to create a “nation of
homeowners.” Yet, the continuing existence of
these programs and institutions, along with mas-
sive tax expenditures and subsidies that favor
housing, may have become perverse. The bulk
of the evidence suggests that federal credit and
insurance programs and institutions focused on
housing today mainly affect the amount of housing
consumed, rather than the homeownership rate.
In other words, continuing large-scale government
intervention in the housing and mortgage markets
primarily constitutes a reallocation of economic
resources toward housing and away from other,
possibly more productive, investment areas. In
Quigley’s words, “most of the housing market
effects are inframarginal.” The obvious implica-
tion for reforming federal housing policy is to seek
to target its benefits much more narrowly on first-
time homebuyers, especially those with low or
moderate incomes. 
Discussant John C. Weicher agrees with much
of Quigley’s broad characterization of U.S. federal
housing policy, but suggests several important
qualifications. In particular, Weicher cites data
that do not show large declines in the FHA share
of home-purchase activity, except very recently.
He also suggests that the FHA’s influence on home-
ownership should not be dismissed, particularly
for minority groups and because FHA programs
appear to accelerate homeownership for many
households, perhaps by five years or so, on average.
One also should not forget that the FHA pioneered
the two most important innovations in the U.S.
mortgage market—long-term, low-down-payment,
self-amortizing mortgages and mortgage securiti-
zation (through Ginnie Mae in the early 1970s).
If given the opportunity by Congress, the FHA
likely would continue to innovate.
Weicher agrees with Quigley that the housing
GSEs appear to exploit their federal charters to
generate large profits for private shareholders,
rather than passing through all of the subsidy,
which was intended for homebuyers. Regarding
their legal mission to “lead the industry” in serving
low- and moderate-income households, Weicher
believes the housing GSEs have failed; indeed,
they actually have underperformed the private
sector until very recently. Weicher demurs from
Quigley’s assertion that the FHA and housing
GSEs compete directly with each other.
While Quigley and Weicher agree that federal
housing policy today is the awkward legacy of
many earlier policy decisions taken independently
of each other, they differ in how best to reform it.
Quigley stresses narrow targeting on first-time
homebuyers, but Weicher focuses on institutional
reform. In particular, Weicher thinks the FHA
should be unshackled and strengthened, while
the GSEs should face much tougher oversight,
especially in moving into new activities. Both
believe the investment portfolios of the housing
GSEs should be restricted or eliminated and that
more ambitious affordable-housing and first-time
homebuyer goals should be set for them.  
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PENSION INSURANCE FROM
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
Asset-liability mismatch was a principal
cause of the Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis of the
1970s and 1980s. Savings institutions held long-
duration assets that were funded by short-duration
liabilities.1 This balance-sheet structure did not
appear unacceptably risky to many observers in
the early 1960s because, for decades, interest rate
movements had been moderate and long-term
interest rates had remained comfortably above
short-term rates.
When the interest rate yield curve rose dra-
matically beginning in the mid-1960s and became
inverted (long-term rates exceeded short-term
rates) several times for significant periods of time
through the early 1980s, the economic value of
most S&L institutions vanished. The federal
deposit-insurance fund for savings institutions
was bankrupted because of the pervasive asset-
liability duration mismatch that had existed among
covered institutions. Subsequent attempts by the
federal government to cover up or wait out the
problems failed. The resulting taxpayer bailout
ended up being even larger than it would have
been if the initial devastating impacts of interest
rate movements on the asset-liability mismatch
had been recognized promptly, because moral-
hazard and adverse-selection incentives com-
pounded the system’s losses.
Zvi Bodie believes a similar disaster—
including both asset-liability mismatch and the
compounding effects of moral hazard and adverse
selection—may be unfolding in the federal govern-
ment’s insurance system for private DB pension
plans. In fact, Bodie has been warning for 15 years
that the possibility of just such a doomsday sce-
nario for DB pension insurance exists. It was only
when the federal government’s PBGC plunged
into deficit in 2002 that his warnings were widely
recognized as plausible. 
In the case of DB pensions, the asset-liability
mismatch at issue is not short-duration liabilities
funding long-duration assets. Instead, DB pension
plans face long-duration liabilities (future pension
obligations) that often are funded to a large extent
by an asset class that might, at first glance, appear
to be a good hedge—namely, corporate equity
investments. After all, today’s conventional wis-
dom is that, in the long run, stock returns essen-
tially always exceed fixed-income returns, which
pension liabilities could be expected to resemble
(Siegel, 2002). According to this view, stocks
actually are less risky than bonds, the longer the
investment horizon. Thus, they are ideal for DB
pension funding.
Bodie argues that this is a “fundamentally
flawed belief about the nature of stock market
risk and reward.” He notes that the cost of buying
protection in the options or swaps markets against
a shortfall in an equity portfolio against a fixed
benchmark is increasing, the longer the invest-
ment horizon. As Bodie explains, “fluctuations
in stock prices do not necessarily cancel out over
time, no matter how long the time period.”
Conventional wisdom before the mid-1960s,
of course, was that interest rates could be expected
to remain low and that the yield curve would not
invert, except in very rare and brief episodes.
That conventional wisdom turned out to be wrong,
resulting in a taxpayer bailout of several-hundred-
billion dollars. Bodie suggests that today’s con-
ventional wisdom about stock market returns and
pension liabilities could be obscuring a similarly
expensive future taxpayer bailout of the PBGC.
He believes that pension-accounting and -funding
rules, together with PBGC insurance premiums,
all should be reformed to recognize the risks
inherent in DB pensions’ mismatching of their
assets and liabilities. 
Discussant Deborah J. Lucas largely accepts
Bodie’s framing of the problems surrounding DB
pensions and provides analysis of two specific
questions. First, what is the PBGC’s current risk
exposure? Second, what motivates corporate
pension managers to invest in stocks? 
To quantify the PBGC’s risk exposure, note
that two things must happen simultaneously
before the PBGC is exposed to loss: A sponsoring
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1 Duration is a measure of the price sensitivity of a financial instru-
ment to changes in interest rates. A long-duration instrument, such
as a 30-year mortgage, is more sensitive to a given interest rate
change than are short-duration instruments, such as one-year time
deposits.company must encounter financial distress, and
the company’s DB plan must be underfunded. To
quantify the PBGC’s risk exposures, therefore, one
must model a compound option.
Even though total underfunding of DB plans
was about $450 billion in 2004, Lucas estimates
(using historical data through 2004 and a Monte
Carlo simulation model) that the PBGC’s expected
net cost over a 20-year horizon is “only” about
$119 billion ($63 billion over a 10-year horizon).
This is because not all underfunded plans’ spon-
sors will default on their pension obligations, nor
do all defaulting DB plan sponsors have under-
funded plans.
Lucas estimates that reducing the share of
DB pension plans’ assets held in equity from the
current 70 percent level to only 30 percent would
reduce the PBGC’s 10-year expected net cost from
$63 billion to about $53 billion—still a significant
risk exposure. One reason that asset allocation
apparently does not play a more significant role
in the PBGC’s risk exposure is that the extent of
underfunding of a defaulting plan matters even
more. Typically, a sponsoring firm approaching
default stops making pension contributions; more-
over, there often is a surge in pension liabilities
at plan termination due to vesting and early-
retirement rules. Lucas also concludes on the
basis of her model that controlling the risk expo-
sure of the PBGC by varying insurance premiums
to sponsoring firms is almost certainly infeasible,
because the level of premiums and their neces-
sary variation across firms would be politically
untenable.
The second important question Lucas
addresses is why pension managers invest such
a large fraction of plan assets in stocks. While
she cannot rule out Bodie’s claim that pension
managers misunderstand the true risk-and-return
characteristics of stocks, Lucas suggests a rational
alternative.
Viewed realistically from a point long before
a worker’s retirement, pension liabilities are not
fixed obligations, like nominal bonds. Instead,
they are uncertain and share some characteristics
of stocks—namely, a positive correlation with
returns on human capital. In other words, benefit
formulas that base the level of benefits on years
of service and/or the final average wage or salary
depend on the worker’s earnings profile, which,
in turn, depends (in part) on the performance of
the economy. Thus, pension managers may ration-
ally invest a large fraction of plan assets in stocks
because they constitute efficient hedging assets
for the types of liabilities pension plans actually
owe.
Lucas concludes that an outright ban on DB
investments in stocks would be inappropriate.
However, her results are consistent with Bodie’s
basic argument that U.S. pension managers tend
to hold too much of their investment assets in
stocks. Bodie and Lucas agree that a likely cause
of DB overinvestment in equities is the current
pension-accounting framework, which allows
sponsoring companies to book current income on
the basis of expected asset returns without regard
to risk. In addition, the largely risk-insensitive
PBGC insurance-premium schedule allows plan
sponsors to share some of the downside risk of
equity investments with taxpayers while keeping
most of the upside risk.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RISK-
SHARING FOR CATASTROPHES
J. David Cummins analyzes the frequency
and severity of natural and man-made catastrophes
in recent years, together with various private
and public risk-sharing mechanisms. Natural
catastrophes include hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, and tsunamis; while man-made catastro-
phes include oil-platform explosions, aviation
disasters, and terrorism.
One conclusion of Cummins’s analysis is
that the frequency and severity of many types of
catastrophes have increased in recent years. He
suggests that long-term movements in nature’s
cycles, such as meteorological trends, or political
developments could be at work.2 One theme that
Cummins uses to tie together trends in natural and
man-made catastrophes is the idea that the scale
of a catastrophe depends on both the nature of
the shock event and our vulnerability to it. For
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2 Cummins is agnostic on the effect of possible global warming on
the frequency and severity of hurricanes.example, hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in
2005 were unusually ferocious storms, but they
also struck coastal areas that had been extensively
developed and poorly protected. In one sense,
therefore, the Gulf Coast hurricanes were both
natural and man-made catastrophes. Rapid and
continuing development of disaster-prone areas,
such as California, Florida, the U.S. Gulf Coast, and
Asia, make large future catastrophes more likely. 
The escalating costs of catastrophes in recent
years have stressed private insurance markets and
exposed gaps and flaws in government insurance
programs. The sheer scale of catastrophe losses
also has forced a reconsideration of whether catas-
trophes are, in fact, “insurable,” in the sense that
private buyers and sellers of catastrophe protec-
tion can agree to terms of coverage. Private insur-
ance for terrorism risk was withdrawn by some
underwriters immediately after the September 11
attacks, for example, while those policies that
remained on the market were unattractively priced
in the view of many potential buyers.
Breakdown in the terrorism insurance market
led to government intervention in the form of a
temporary federal terrorism risk reinsurance
system (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002;
renewed in 2005). Similarly, perceived insurance-
market failures after Hurricane Andrew in Florida
in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake in
California in 1994 led to government interven-
tions—in both cases, by the respective state gov-
ernments. The National Flood Insurance Program
was created in 1968 in response to perceived
inadequacies in the private market. Governments
in many other countries also are active in provid-
ing insurance coverage for catastrophes. 
Cummins is optimistic with regard to the
global insurability of many catastrophic events,
suggesting that the vast financial capacity of finan-
cial markets can and should supplement the
risk-underwriting capacity of private insurance
and reinsurance companies. Catastrophe futures
contracts were launched in 1992, and catastrophe
bonds followed in 1994. Although the catastrophe
futures contracts later were withdrawn because
too little trading occurred, catastrophe bonds
appear to have established themselves. They
effectively expand the pool of capital resources
available to insure catastrophes, and they provide
diversification opportunities for investors of all
types. 
As for the role of government insurance for
catastrophe risk, Cummins believes there may be
an appropriate risk-sharing role for certain narrow
classes of risk, such as terrorism. The risk of ter-
rorism depends, to some extent, on government
foreign policy, and much of the information that
would be needed for a private insurer to under-
write the risk is classified and, hence, unavailable.
Efforts to mitigate terrorism risk depend crucially
on the Department of Homeland Security, over
which private insurers have no authority. Thus,
one could argue that terrorism risk should be
borne, at least in part, by the federal government.
Clearly, some existing government insurance
programs are poorly designed. For example, the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is not
actuarially sound (individual households do not
pay premiums that reflect their risks to the pro-
gram); it does not collect aggregate premiums
high enough to cover both losses and operating
expenses, so it was insolvent even before the 2005
hurricane season; and there is no control over
“repetitive-loss policies,” which are properties
that flood repeatedly. Moreover, insurance-
penetration rates are low even in areas that are
designated as flood prone. In sum, the NFIP is a
case study in moral hazard, adverse selection, and
non-economic management of an insurance pro-
gram. Cummins believes a private sector solution
to the problem of flood insurance is feasible,
especially if catastrophe bonds were created to
diversify local risks. The appropriate role of the
federal government in flood insurance is to
reinsure private insurers at prices that would
allow the government to break even.
More generally, Cummins believes govern-
ments should remove obstacles to private sector
solutions to catastrophe insurance. Prime exam-
ples of obstacles that could be removed are dis-
advantageous accounting and tax rules and
prudential regulations that affect banks, insurance
companies, and other financial institutions. In
some instances, governments should mandate
universal insurance coverage, such as in earth-
quake zones and hurricane-prone areas.
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than Cummins that private markets can insure
all, or virtually all, catastrophe risks. If these risks
are drawn from probability distributions with
“fat tails,” then standard statistical diversification
techniques may fail to provide a sound basis for
private sector insurance provision.3
Yet, private insurance for catastrophes has
been provided in the past in the United States
and in other countries (for example, flood insur-
ance in London). Thus, there must be other imped-
iments that interfere with market solutions to the
problem of catastrophe risk. Jaffee suggests that
these impediments include excessively risk-averse
insurance-company managers; over-zealous insur-
ance regulators; disagreements between insurers
and customers about a fair price for coverage4;
genuine uncertainty surrounding the key risk
parameters (the probability of an event and the
loss given an event); and the need to share cata-
strophic losses intertemporally (i.e., pay off losses
over time), in addition to across insured parties.
Given that private markets for catastrophe
insurance can fail for a number of reasons, Jaffee
does not find it surprising that “citizens depend-
ably call on their government to fix the failure.”
The question of government involvement in
catastrophe insurance, therefore, is “not so much
‘if’ as it is ‘how’ and ‘how long’.”
After reviewing federal flood and terrorism-
risk insurance, as well as state-backed earthquake
and hurricane insurance programs in California
and Florida, respectively, Jaffee concludes that
government intervention, when necessary, should
mimic private sector insurance coverage to the
greatest extent possible. In particular, Jaffee would
not make catastrophe insurance coverage manda-
tory for all households or businesses, except where
required by mortgage lenders, for example.
Government intervention should be temporary,
when feasible; governments should use risk-based
pricing, to the extent possible; and they should
avoid using subsidies, to minimize budgetary
cost and to prevent risk-increasing behavior on
the part of the insured. 
PANEL DISCUSSION
Three eminent panelists discussed the fol-
lowing questions during the last session of the
conference:
• What is the appropriate role of the federal
government in the private markets for credit
and insurance?
• What is the outlook for government involve-
ment in these markets?
Panelist Kenneth J. Arrow reflected on the
imperfect role of government regulatory mecha-
nisms in recreating the effects of competitive
markets for risk-sharing.5 One reason competitive
markets are missing in the first place is that house-
holds are not fully rational. Nor do we understand
why risk-averse households do not fully use the
risk-sharing opportunities that are available. Even
a catastrophe such as a hurricane is a small event
on a global scale, so financial markets and insti-
tutions surely could disperse the risks that house-
holds and businesses face.
Another example of a risk-sharing market that
is poorly developed is health insurance. Because
of information asymmetries between individuals
and health insurers, too little health insurance is
traded in the private market. Without government
intervention, Arrow asserted, there would be little
in the way of a health insurance market.
Some catastrophes, such as war, are too large
for markets to be expected to provide full insur-
ance. Other limits to insurability include desirable
contracts that are not legally enforceable, or cases
where the insurance company has more informa-
tion than the insurance buyer. On the other hand,
the insurance buyer may have more information
than the insurance company, opening up the
possibility of the well-known problems of adverse
3 A fat-tailed probability distribution is one in which extreme
events occur more frequently than would be the case if the risk
were drawn from a normal distribution.
4 For example, fewer than 14 percent of affected homeowners
purchase earthquake insurance from the California Earthquake
Authority, which is compelled by state law to offer coverage at
“actuarially based” rates.
Emmons and Pennington-Cross
230 JULY/AUGUST 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
5 Professor Arrow did not provide written comments for this volume.
This introduction includes a comprehensive summary of his
comments at the conference.selection and moral hazard. In some situations,
the quality or quantity of information or service
is difficult to monitor, as in medical care. In each
case, the result is too little risk-sharing from the
perspective of social welfare.
Arrow argued that deposit insurance is an
example of a reasonable government response to
information-based market failure that some policy-
makers do not understand. For example, some
government advisors recommended abolishing
deposit insurance in the aftermath of the S&L
deposit insurance debacle in the early 1990s.
Their argument was that, without deposit insur-
ance, depositors would monitor their banks and
impose discipline better than government regu-
lators could. Arrow viewed this as a bad idea; how
would depositors have enough information to
monitor their bank’s financial condition?
Another important role for government is
ensuring the solvency of private insurance
providers. As in the case of banks covered by
deposit insurance, it didn’t seem reasonable to
Arrow to expect individuals to be able to monitor
the financial health of their insurance companies.
A similar information-gathering role could be
played by government in assembling data about
hospitals and physicians.
The crucial role of information explains why
regulation is important. One form of regulation
is required disclosure, as in securities markets.
Another is to maintain the quality of buildings
through building codes or other goods and services
through technical standards. Of course, private
bodies, such as rating agencies, sometimes pro-
vide adequate information. There is no clear-cut
explanation of when private markets gather and
disseminate information efficiently and when they
do not. We must look at each case individually.
Arrow commended the new field of behavioral
economics for questioning the tenets of classical
economics. Do consumers choose rationally?
Clearly, they do not always do so. It has taken a
long time, but economists finally are facing up to
the limitations of our assumptions about rational
choice.
For example, economists and finance profes-
sors themselves may appear irrational by living
in an earthquake-prone zone, such as the San
Francisco Bay area, but declining to buy earth-
quake insurance. Indeed, only 14 percent of
Californians own such insurance. It appears to
be the case that most people underestimate the
probability of an earthquake but overestimate its
severity. How does this affect their decisions about
whether to buy earthquake insurance or not? The
same set of complicated issues exists in the case
of flood insurance, with the majority of flooded
residents in New Orleans remaining uninsured
when Hurricane Katrina hit. Our theories, even
the celebrated loss-aversion theory of Kahneman
and Tversky (1991), do not explain this behavior. 
Another impediment to full risk-sharing is
high transaction costs. For example, it is costly
to avoid fraud, verify losses, and administer the
entire premium-collection and claims-payment
process.
Arrow also pointed out the difficulty we face
in making rules and laws designed to create incen-
tives to lower risk. For example, suppose we
decide that motorcycle riders must wear helmets
when they ride. This law will be accompanied
by a rule that says no motorcycle rider who is
injured while not wearing a helmet will be treated
for his or her head injuries. Clearly, a tough set
of helmet laws like this should increase the rate
at which motorcycle riders wear helmets. It also
should reduce the costs to society of treating head
injuries. But, Arrow wondered, would we really
deny medical treatment to an injured rider who
had failed to wear a helmet? Given that everyone
will anticipate this response, will the helmet law
be credible?
Panelist Robert E. Litan focused his remarks
on the unrecognized liabilities of the federal
government, particularly with regard to natural
disasters. Following the theme suggested by
Arrow, Litan stressed the importance of two dis-
tinct objectives when governments intervene in
the markets for catastrophe risk. First, the govern-
ment should encourage individuals, businesses,
and government at all levels to minimize the
cost of disasters that occur. Second, losses should
be compensated in a way that interferes least with
loss-mitigation efforts.
A key point to remember is that government
policies can affect the probability or severity of
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automobile emissions may affect the environment,
which, in turn, may affect the frequency and
severity of hurricanes and droughts.
A long-term view also is necessary when
deciding whom to compensate and by how much
after a natural disaster. The problem of moral
hazard is of great importance because people learn
quickly that government compensation observed
in the past is likely to be repeated. For example,
many houses were rebuilt in Florida after recent
hurricanes because, one must presume, people
saw how quickly homeowners’ losses were com-
pensated in the previous hurricanes.
Private insurance can and does play an impor-
tant role in assisting government mitigation and
compensation objectives. However, Litan believes
the private sector cannot replace government
involvement altogether for catastrophe risks. Nor
is he optimistic about the capacity of catastrophe
bonds to supplement insurance markets in a
meaningful way.
Litan believes the government should estab-
lish a formal reinsurance system for mega-
catastrophes, in order to build an insurance
surplus and provide incentives for loss prevention
and mitigation. Actuarially based pricing would
encourage people to choose the risks they under-
take on a more rational basis. The unique ability
of the federal government to share risks across
generations through borrowing and taxation make
it the appropriate insurer of last resort.
Panelist Joseph E. Stiglitz focused his remarks
on the role of government in risk-bearing. He
pointed to the many reasons why private insur-
ance markets might fail, including risks too large
for private insurers to bear; moral hazard on the
part of individuals who anticipate a government
bailout, leading to too little insurance and, per-
versely, the very bailout they anticipated; inter-
generational risks, such as economic depressions;
and a variety of contracting problems broadly
described by the notion of asymmetries of infor-
mation between buyers and sellers of insurance.
To this list could be added the difficult problems
of accounting for insurance liabilities, leading to
some uncertainty about the solvency of individual
insurance firms.
Stiglitz suggested that recent natural disasters
have established two certainties—large numbers
of people and businesses who face significant risks
from natural disasters have no or inadequate
insurance coverage; and, partly as a consequence,
it is rational to expect government bailouts when
disasters occur. It is not clear whether private or
public approaches to these interrelated problems
are better.
Stiglitz drew on his experience of the East
Asian financial crises of the late 1990s to suggest
that the failure of large numbers of individuals to
purchase insurance can produce macroeconomic
externalities. This consideration alone may con-
stitute a justification for government intervention.
On a related note, he argued that Social Security
reforms could, under some circumstances, even-
tually lead to a large number of elderly people
living in poverty. In effect, the reduction in risk-
sharing implicit in the proposed reforms would
leave many people underinsured against old-age
poverty. Collectively, this underinsurance would
create externalities for society. A government
bailout of some sort then would become likely.
Likewise, the health insurance system in the
U.S. leaves large numbers of people chronically
underinsured. The result is a variety of external-
ities that are borne in varying degrees by every-
one else.
In sum, Stiglitz concluded that government
bailouts are inefficient and inequitable. It would
be preferable to establish more formal risk-sharing
mechanisms in advance, both to provide incen-
tives for reallocating risks efficiently and to avoid
arbitrary and highly politicized redistributions of
wealth in the wake of a catastrophe. To establish
such a formal risk-sharing framework, government
interventions of one sort or another are inevitable
and desirable.
AN UNFINISHED AGENDA
Despite optimism among many participants
at the conference that federal legislation would
be forthcoming to improve the functioning of
many federal credit and insurance programs, very
little had occurred by mid-2006. Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid remain on unsustainable
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horizon. Legislation to reform GSEs remains
stalled, as does legislation to reform defined-
benefit pension plans. Federal flood insurance
reforms await action, even as another hurricane
season begins. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002 was extended at the end of 2005, but the
final form of federal reinsurance for terrorism
risk remains uncertain.
The necessary first step in reforming federal
credit and insurance programs is debate and dis-
cussion. The proceedings of this 2005 Economic
Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis provide a foundation of debate and
discussion on which future reforms can be based.
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